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Introduction
No previous study has taken advantage of the "natural experiment" provided by the Japanese zero-interest rate period to analyze the exchange rate effects of intervention when intervention is disconnected from traditional monetary policy moves. 1 The contribution of this paper is to assess whether sterilized intervention is effective when interest rates are zero and intervention cannot signal future monetary policy changes, and to determine through which channel of transmission intervention during this particular macroeconomic environment works.
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The Japanese zero-interest rate period began in January 1999 when money market rates effectively hit the lower bound (see Figure 1 ). At the outset of this period, the Japanese monetary authorities, i.e. the Bank of Japan acting as the agent for the Japanese Ministry of Finance, entered an intervention regime of unprecedented proportions, selling an astonishing total of USD 0.5 trillion worth of JPY against purchases of USD, roughly equivalent to 10% of Japan's yearly GDP, over a period of little more than five years. With Japanese interest rates remaining at the lower bound throughout this prolonged period of frequent and often large-scale interventions, and all interventions in the JPY/USD market carried out as unilateral sales of JPY by the Japanese monetary authorities, it is not possible for the interventions to send a signal of a future decrease in interest rates, thus effectiveness of intervention through the signaling transmission channel of future monetary policy is ruled out a-priori. 3 The Japanese zero-interest rate period, 1 See, for example, Ito (2003) for a study of Japanese intervention during the 1991 to 2001 period, and Fatum and Hutchison (2005) and Ito (2005) for studies focusing on the 2003 to 2004 period. Humpage (2003) , Neely (2005) , Sarno and Taylor (2001) and others provide surveys of the intervention literature. 2 Few studies investigate the transmission channels of intervention. Exceptions include empirical studies by Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) , Fatum and Hutchison (1999) , and Lewis (1995) . Kumhof (2010) provides a theoretical model of the portfolio balance channel effects of intervention. 3 Moreover, as discussed in Ito (2005) , the Japanese institutional framework for intervention, where government bonds with 3-month maturity (so-called Fiscal Bills) are issued first in order to obtain the JPY necessary for carrying out interventions, guarantees that all interventions are sterilized, i.e. there is no institutional link between Japanese interventions and the monetary base. Furthermore, Fatum and Hutchison (2005) show that the Japanese therefore, provides a "natural experiment" for investigating the effectiveness of sterilized intervention when traditional monetary policy options are constrained and, as a consequence, the signaling channel of intervention, often viewed as a particularly important transmission channel, is not functioning.
The traditional view of the intervention literature is that if intervention works, intervention is effective through signaling (by carrying out intervention the central bank informs the market about its future monetary policy intentions) or through portfolio balance effects (by carrying out intervention the central bank changes the relative demand and supply of imperfectly substitutable foreign and domestic assets). More recently, an additional transmission channel, deemed the coordination channel, has been proposed (by carrying out publicly announced intervention when individual market participants are hesitant to risk betting on a reversal of the exchange rate towards its equilibrium because of substantial exchange rate misalignment and coordination failure the central bank takes on a coordinating role that organizes "smart money"
to enter the market at the same time, thereby causing the exchange rate to reverse).
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A necessary condition for intervention to disseminate information and be effective through channels such as the signaling or the coordination channel, is that the market is aware of intervention being carried out (otherwise a signal about future monetary policy intentions or current exchange rate misalignments will go unnoticed, in which case it is not possible for these channels to function). 5 By contrast, the portfolio balance channel does not require market awareness for intervention to work. Instead, this channel can only work if intervention is actually interventions are not significantly linked to changes in the monetary base, i.e. the sterilized interventions of the zerointerest rate period are not connected to the coinciding path of quantitative monetary easing. 4 See Edison (1993) for a thorough exposition of the signaling and the portfolio balance channels, and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for details regarding the coordination channel and a discussion of the relative importance of the transmission channels of intervention. 5 While Sarno and Taylor (2001) suggest that intervention must be publicly announced in order for the coordination channel to function, market awareness based on rumors of intervention might be sufficient.
carried out (otherwise the relative demand and supply of foreign and domestic assets do not change), and the larger the intervention volume the larger the portfolio balance effects.
To address the possibility that market awareness of intervention matters, the analysis integrates the official Japanese intervention data with a comprehensive set of newswire reports capturing days on which there is a rumor of intervention -distinguishing between rumors of intervention on days when intervention occur and rumors of intervention on days when no intervention occur -as well as days with official statements pertaining to intervention and the exchange rate. This is important, not only because other studies have found that "oral intervention" can influence the exchange rate (see Fratzcher 2008 and others), but because if market awareness matters, effectiveness of intervention cannot be explained by portfolio balance effects alone.
The existing literature combining intervention data with newswire reports of intervention generally uses newswire reports of intervention to indicate whether the market is aware of an intervention or whether an intervention is carried out in secrecy. 6 However, a report of intervention is typically on the newswire the day after the intervention the report refers to is carried out. For example, a firm report of the 12 January 1999 official Japanese intervention operation is reported on the newswire on 13 January 1999. Therefore, whether or not an intervention is reported is generally a matter of "after-the-fact" information that can play no role in the contemporaneous exchange rate response to intervention. By contrast, rumors and speculation of intervention are generally picked up by the newswire the same day they occur.
Accordingly, the analysis of this paper uses rumors or speculation of intervention rather than reports of intervention to indicate market awareness as well as market perception of intervention.
The analysis of the paper employs GARCH time series models for the baseline analysis, includes macro surprises in the estimations, tests for delayed effects, controls for endogeneity, and carries out a variety of robustness checks. In addition, the analysis pays careful attention to the possibility that institutional changes are associated with parameter instability and, as a result, carries out the analysis on the full zero-interest rate intervention period as well as separately on well-defined sub-samples. The results show that intervention, on average, exerts a significant same-day influence on the JPY/USD exchange rate during the zero-interest rate period.
Regardless of whether or not the market is aware of intervention. The paper rejects the hypothesis of a systematic and significant link between days when there is a rumor of intervention but no intervention occurs, and the JPY/USD exchange rate. Similarly, the paper shows that official statements are insignificant and do not influence the exchange rate.
With market awareness shown not to be important and constrained monetary policy preventing the signaling channel from functioning, the effects of Japanese interventions during the zero-interest rate period are consistent only with the workings of the portfolio balance channel. This is a remarkable finding, demonstrating that the portfolio balance channel matters more than most studies seem to suggest and, therefore, that sterilized intervention is, in principle, an independent policy instrument.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the data. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, model extensions, and robustness checks. Section 5 assesses the economic importance of the Japanese intervention policy. Section 6 concludes.
Data
The official Japanese intervention data consists of daily volumes of intervention operations in the daily market turnover is 1.3% across the full sample period, and ranges from roughly 2% during the first sub-period to roughly 1% during the second and third sub-periods.
The Factiva search engine and a comprehensive combination of various search words (e.g. Bank of Japan, intervention etc.) are used to find the days with a rumor of intervention. The second row of Table 2 shows that a total of 269 days across the full sample are associated with a rumor of intervention. Row three of Summary statistics for the JPY/USD exchange rate and the macro news surprises are displayed in Table 3 .
Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis follows Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) in estimating a regression equation
with residuals modeled as a GARCH process. The basic empirical relationship of the analysis is given by the GARCH(p,q) specification:
(1)
where a is a constant; Equation (2) states that the error term is normally distributed with zero mean and timedependant (conditional) variance t h . Equation (3) shows that the variance depends on the squared error of the past q periods (the ARCH terms) and the conditional variance of the past p periods.
The estimation strategy is as follows. First, simultaneous estimations of equations (1) through (3) sub-samples. For each of the estimations, the most parsimonious GARCH specification possible, that still allows for acceptance of the null hypothesis of no ARCH in the standardized residuals, is selected. As it turns out, GARCH(1,1) models give the better fit in all cases. The results of the baseline estimations carried out separately on the two sub-samples are displayed in Table 5 . The first column of Ito (2005) conjectures that interventions during the Mitzoguchi period are less effective due to increased uncertainty among financial market participants in regards to when interventions are carried out and what the interventions are meant to achieve.
Results

RUMOR
NoInt are significant, and none of the statement variables is significant. This is the case for both sub-samples.
To summarize the findings of the baseline estimations, intervention during the zerointerest rate period is, on average, effective in influencing the level of the exchange rate. The average effect of interventions carried out during the Sakikabara/Kuroda period is significantly stronger than the average effect of interventions carried out during the subsequent Mitzoguchi intervention period. Whether or not there is a coincident rumor of intervention, i.e. whether or not the market is aware of the intervention operation, is unimportant and does not help explain the associated exchange rate movement. A related finding is that neither a statement regarding exchange rate or intervention policy nor rumors of intervention on days with no intervention play a significant role in explaining day-to-day exchange rate movements.
Overall, the findings clearly show that intervention carried out during the zero-interest rate period is effective and, by elimination of other possible transmission channels, that intervention works through the portfolio-balance channel. This is a remarkable finding, considering that portfolio effects are oftentimes viewed as small and unimportant. However, while the importance of the portfolio balance channel might reasonably be dismissed in the context of small intervention volumes relative to large daily market turnover, the Japanese interventions during the zero-interest rate regime are anything but small. Instead, the average daily intervention amount during the Sakikabara/Kuroda zero-interest rate period accounts for more than 2% of the average total daily market turnover, and roughly 1% during the Mitzoguchi intervention period (details provided in Table 1 ). In other words, the Japanese interventions under study are, on average, of such a magnitude that it would seem surprising not to find evidence of detectable portfolio balance effects.
Delayed Effects
Exchange rate markets are generally perceived to be highly efficient and characterized by sameday processing of news, but in the context of unannounced interventions that often occur with the market seemingly unaware, it is necessary to test for delayed effects to ensure that the contemporaneous coefficient estimates fully capture the exchange rate effects.
In order to account for the possibility of delayed exchange rate effects, Equation (1) of the baseline model is augmented to include five lags of the explanatory intervention and statement variables: Table 6 shows the results of simultaneous estimations of Equations (2) through (4), carried out separately across the two sub-samples. As the table shows, none of the lags of INT is significant. As before, the coefficient estimates associated with the contemporaneous effects of intervention are highly significant (at 99%) as well as of the same sign and virtually the same magnitude as in the baseline estimations. Moreover, all lags of the slope shifter variables and the indicator variables are insignificant.
14 The complete absence of delayed effects implies that the estimated contemporaneous exchange rate effect of intervention fully describes how the exchange rate responds to intervention.
Endogeneity
To control for endogeneity, the analysis of this section follows the daily data studies by Humpage (1999) and Namalendran and Naranjo (2000) Following Ito (2003) and Ito and Yabu (2007) , the reaction functions are specified as:
where TARGET is the first-difference of the log of the JPY/USD deviation from an exchange rate target of 125 JPY/USD, MADAY is the 21-day moving average of the log of the JPY/USD exchange rate, and MAYEAR is the one-year moving average of the log of the JPY/USD exchange rate. 15 The reaction function estimations are carried out separately across the 1 January The variable TARGET is included (and significant) in the reaction function estimations displayed in Ito (2003) , but not included in Ito and Yabu (2007) . Inclusion of TARGET is possibly problematic due to a high degree of collinearity with the JPY/USD exchange rate. As it turns out, TARGET is insignificant in all the estimations and, therefore, subsequently excluded from the analysis. The reaction function estimation results are not shown for brevity but available upon request.
respectively. 16 It should be noted that while the reaction function estimates are free of simultaneity bias due to the exclusion of contemporaneous exchange rate changes as explanatory variables, the cost of avoiding endogeneity is that there is no account for the possibility of within-day exchange rate movements triggering and/or determining the size of some interventions. In other words, the estimated reaction function parameters possibly suffer from omitted variable bias instead of endogeneity.
The results of the re-estimation of the model described in Equations (1) through (3) using unexpected intervention in place of actual intervention are shown in Table 7 . While these results are qualitatively identical to those pertaining to the baseline analysis without controlling for endogeneity, it is interesting to notice that the coefficient estimate associated with intervention during the Sakikabara/Kuroda period (first column of Table 7 ) has increased by almost 20%
(1.42E06 versus 1.21E06, the latter estimate displayed in the first column of Table 5 ), consistent with the idea that not controlling for endogeneity leads to a downward simultaneity bias in the estimated effect of intervention. 
Robustness
In order to check the robustness of the results, the analysis is also carried out using a different estimation technique, a different conditional mean specification, different sub-sample demarcation points, and the intervention reaction functions used to isolate the unexpected element of intervention are re-estimated using contemporaneous macro surprises as additional 16 The increased intervention frequency between 26 December 2003 and 31 March 2004 implies a change in intervention policy and thus a separate intervention regime. Since this sub-period is too short for a meaningful separate reaction function estimation, it is simply excluded from the reaction function estimations and from the associated re-estimation of the baseline model using unexpected intervention in place of actual intervention. 17 Since the 26 December 2003 to 31 March 2004 sub-period is excluded from the estimations that control for endogeneity, the estimations displayed in the second column of Table 7 refer to a different sub-sample than those displayed in the second column of Table 5 . Therefore, a similar comparison of coefficient estimates associated with the Mitzoguchi intervention period is not applicable.
explanatory variables. The robustness results are not reported for brevity but available from the author upon request.
First, all estimations are carried out using OLS estimation techniques with robust heteroskedasticity-and serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard errors instead of GARCH.
All the previously described baseline results reported in Tables 4 and 5 regarding the intervention and the statement variables are completely unchanged across both the full sample and the two sub-samples. In addition, the augmented delayed effects model as well as the models addressing endogeneity are re-estimated using OLS and HAC standard errors, yielding identical results to those reported in Tables 6 and 7 Fourth, the intervention reaction function models are extended to include Japanese macro surprises that could influence the decision to intervene. As noted earlier, previous studies have documented that macro surprises influence day-to-day exchange rate changes. These surprises, therefore, can be interpreted as proxies for contemporaneous movements in the exchange rate.
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As it turns out, (positive) GDP surprises and (positive) CPI surprises help explain intervention, and inclusion of these significant macro surprise variables improve the fit of the reaction function models slightly. Re-estimation of the baseline models using unexpected intervention derived from the news augmented reaction function models leads to qualitatively identical results as those reported in Table 7 .
Economic Effects
It is standard in the literature on foreign exchange intervention to translate coefficient estimates associated with the effects of intervention into measures of the exchange rate effect of a USD 100 million intervention operation. The second row of Table 8 shows that the estimates translate 18 The four intervention days are 12 January 1999 , 10 June 1999 , 14 June 1999 , and 21 June 1999 See Fatum and Hutchison (2010) .
into exchange rate effects of a USD 100 million intervention ranging from a JPY depreciation of 0.014% to a JPY depreciation of 0.0015%.
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At a first glance, these economic effects seem negligible compared to, for example, an oft-cited point of reference, Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) , who show that their estimated coefficients correspond to an exchange rate effect of 1.5% of a USD 100 million intervention.
The average daily intervention amounts during the more recent zero-interest rate period are, however, dramatically different from those pertaining to the older studies of exchange rate markets and intervention, rendering a benchmark based on the economic effects of a USD 100 million intervention operation misleading. 21 A better way to get a sense of the economic importance of intervention is to measure the exchange rate effect of the average daily intervention amount. The third row of Table 8 shows that the exchange rate effect of average daily intervention ranges from an average 0.7% depreciation of the JPY during the first 4 years of the zero-interest rate regime to an average 0.11% and 0.04% depreciation during the first year and during the last three months, respectively, of the Mitzoguchi intervention period.
While these numbers certainly show that the average economic effects of intervention are not negligible, by construction they do not shed light on the total exchange rate effect of all the interventions carried out during the zero-interest rate period. The fifth row of Table 8 shows that interventions carried out during the 4-year Sakikabara/Kuroda period depreciated the JPY by roughly 20%, and the interventions carried out during the 5-quarter Mitzoguchi intervention 20 Alternatively, the three coefficient estimates translate into an exchange rate effect associated with a JPY 1 trillion intervention ranging from 1.21% to 0.45% to 0.14%, as displayed in the third row of period depreciated the JPY by more than 10%, respectively. 22 In other words, the combined economic effect of all the JPY intervention sales during the zero-interest rate period is, ceteris paribus, a very substantial JPY depreciation of roughly 30%.
A straightforward counterfactual assessment of what might have been the JPY/USD rate at the time the active Japanese intervention regime ended in March 2004 had these interventions not occurred suggests that the rate would have been in the mid-or high 70s (second-last row of Table 8 ). This would constitute a massive deviation from the actual rate in the mid-100s (last row of Table 8 ). The macroeconomic implications of such a strong JPY would likely have been devastating for the Japanese economy. Clearly, the economic effects of the interventions carried out during the zero-interest rate regime are of immense importance to the JPY/USD rate and the Japanese economy. 
Conclusion
During the first little more than five years of the Japanese zero-interest rate period, the Japanese monetary authorities sold an unprecedented total of USD 0.5 trillion worth of JPY in the JPY/USD foreign exchange market. The unusual combination of a prolonged macroeconomic period of constrained monetary policy and frequent as well as oftentimes large-scale interventions provides a "natural experiment" for investigating whether interventions that cannot work through the standard signaling channel of future monetary policy can still be effective in 22 These exchange rate effect estimates are broadly consistent with Ito (2005) , who calculates the combined exchange rate effect of the five quarters of intervention during the Mitzoguchi period to a JPY depreciation of 13%. 23 In light of the substantial effects of these interventions, it is not surprising that the US and some European countries grew increasingly concerned with the active Japanese intervention policy during the zero-interest rate period. The concern culminated in a fairly critical statement issued by the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Meeting Governors Meeting in September 2003 in which the desirability of exchange rate flexibility was proponed (without any mentioning of which country or countries the statement was aimed at). See Ito (2005) for additional details. See also Taylor (2006) for an interesting discussion of the exchange rate policy of the Bush administration and why the Japanese intervention policy was met with relative acceptance.
influencing the level of the exchange rate. Since market awareness of intervention is a necessary condition for intervention to work through transmission channels other than the portfolio balance channel, the analysis also tests if market awareness plays a role in explaining the link between intervention and exchange rate movements when interest rates are at the lower bound.
Using a GARCH time series methodology for the baseline analysis, the paper shows that official intervention, whether or not the market is aware of the intervention, exerts a statistically significant same-day influence on the JPY/USD exchange rate. Considering that market awareness is shown to be unimportant and, moreover, the macroeconomic and institutional environment prevents the signaling channel from functioning, this is a remarkable finding that demonstrates that the portfolio balance channel matters after all.
The economic effects implied by the estimates of the exchange rate effects of intervention when taking into account the total intervention volumes spent by the Japanese monetary authorities during the zero-interest rate period are very substantial. During the first 4 years of the zero-interest rate period, the total of USD 0.15 trillion worth of JPY sold against USD is associated with a 20% depreciation of the JPY, and during the subsequent 5-quarters, the total of USD 0.35 trillion worth of JPY sold is associated with a JPY depreciation of more than 10%. In other words, the combined economic effect of all the Japanese interventions carried out during the zero-interest rate period add up to a JPY depreciation of roughly 30%, implying a counterfactual JPY/USD rate in the mid-or high-70s at the time the active Japanese intervention (a) INT is official intervention; RUMOR is a rumor of intervention; INT RUMOR is intervention on days with a rumor of intervention; INT NoRUMOR is intervention on days with no rumor of intervention; RUMOR NoINT is a rumor of intervention when no intervention occurs; POSSTAT is an official statement in support of intervention and/or a weaker JPY; NEGSTAT is an official statement suggesting that further intervention in the JPY/USD rate is not recommended or unlikely; REP is a firm report of intervention. NoINT is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 on days when there is a rumor of intervention but no intervention occurs, and 0 otherwise; POSSTAT is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 on days when there is an official statement in support of intervention and/or a weaker JPY, and 0 otherwise; NEGSTAT is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 on days when there is an official statement suggesting that further intervention in the JPY/USD rate is unlikely or not recommended, and 0 otherwise. (1) (2) and (3) Table 5 ). Coefficient estimates are associated with a USD 1 million intervention. (b)
The exchange rate effect of a JPY 1 trillion intervention is calculated using JPY/USD exchange rate averages. The average JPY/USD exchange rates across the three sub-periods are 117. 04, 115.86, and 107.22, respectively. (c) The average daily intervention amounts (in billions of USD) across the three subperiods are 4.9, 2.2 and 2.8, respectively. (c)
The exchange rate effect of the total amount of intervention is the total withinperiod intervention in trillions of JPY times the associated exchange rate effect of a JPY 1 trillion intervention.
The counterfactual end-of-period exchange rate is the start-of-period rate net of the actual within-period percentage rate change minus the effect of total within-period intervention. The start-of-period rate for the first sub-period is 111.85 (the actual JPY/USD rate primo 1999), the start-of-period rate for the subsequent periods is the counterfactual end-of-period rate of the immediately preceding sub-period (98 and 80, respectively).
